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Abstract: For over a century we have attempted to understand human 
aesthetic experience using scientific methods. A typical experiment 
could be described as reductive and quasi-psychophysical. We vary 
some aspect of the stimulus and systematically measure some aspect 
of the aesthetic response. The limitations of this approach can be 
categorized as problems on the Y axis (what we measure) and the X 
axis (what we manipulate). The most enigmatic components of 
aesthetic experience include inclination to cry, aesthetic rapture, a 
sense of the sublime, and intense fascination. However, we cannot 
evoke these ‘hot’ aesthetic emotions in the lab, at least not with well 
controlled stimuli on multiple trials. We thus resort to measuring cold, 
cognitive preference ratings. There are also problems on the X axis. 
The reductive psychophysical approach explicitly assumes that there 
are lawful relations between different stimulus dimensions and prefer-
ences. It also tacitly assumes that these dimensions are independent 
and orthogonal. The second assumption is implausible. Whatever 
stimulus-preference laws we discover are likely to be twisted and 
modulated when another dimension is added to the stimuli. This 
‘gestalt nightmare’ has long been recognized, but never resolved. This 
matters, because human aesthetic faculties are probably tuned to the 
balance and relationship of parts which make up a whole and are 
indifferent to the parts presented in isolation. I conclude that the 
future of scientific aesthetics depends on how successfully we can 
transcend reductive, quasi-psychophysical approaches. 
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1. Introduction 
Empirical aesthetics seeks to explain human preferences and aesthetic 
experience by using scientific methods (Palmer, Schloss and 
Sammartino, 2013). Nobody doubts that near-universal human 
preferences exist. For example, every sane person likes eating cakes 
more than gravel or poison. Everyone prefers clean drinking water and 
comfortable room temperatures, and we all want peers to admire us. 
These mundane preferences can easily be explained by natural 
selection: brains are partly organized by genes, and the genes that 
code for brains with these preferences were replicated. Other genes 
may have coded for brains inclined towards self-destruction, but these 
genes were never replicated. Certain adaptive preferences are bound to 
become universal over evolutionary time. 
However, aesthetic preferences seem to be a different category 
because they do not have an immediately obvious evolutionary 
explanation (although they may have a less obvious one upon careful 
consideration). For instance, most people have a strong positive 
reaction to their favourite music. But why? How is listening to music 
relevant for survival and reproduction? From our genes’ point of view, 
indulging our aesthetic faculties seems like a waste of time. Neverthe-
less, people do spend a lot of time listening to music, reading literature 
and watching films, looking at artworks and admiring nature, and 
numerous other practices which engage our conscious aesthetic 
faculties. Preference without obvious evolutionary explanation is an 
intriguing mystery for psychologists. This is just one of the reasons 
that empirical aesthetics has expanded dramatically in recent years, 
with new journals (e.g. Art and Perception), books (e.g. Shimamura 
and Palmer, 2012), international conferences (e.g. Visual Science of 
Art), and even institutions (e.g. Max Plank Institute for Empirical 
Aesthetics in Frankfurt: http://www.aesthetics.mpg.de/). 
Here I argue that there are deep limitations with contemporary 
aesthetic science. More specifically, there are problems with what we 
might call the ‘psychophysical approach’ or the ‘reductive approach’. 
Psychophysicists vary some objective property of the stimuli, and 
measure subjective experience of that property. For example, we can 
vary the brightness of a light (plotted on the X axis), and measure 
subjective brightness evaluations (plotted on the Y axis). Then we can 
discover the function that relates the objective stimulus properties to 
subjective experience (Figure 1A). Perhaps it is possible to discover 
truths about human aesthetic preferences in a similar way? Can we 
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186 A.D.J.  MAKIN 
vary some objective property of the stimuli (X axis) and measure 
subjective preferences (Y axis)? Early pioneers of scientific aesthetics, 
such as Fechner (1876), Birkhoff (1932), Eysenck (1941), and Berlyne 
(1971), all proposed lawful functions relating stimulus properties to 
subjective preferences. This is still a very common approach 
(reviewed in Palmer, Schloss and Sammartino, 2013). 
Criticism of empirical aesthetics is also old. Dickie (1962) claimed 
that psychology experiments that measure average preferences in lay 
people are ‘irrelevant’ to understanding aesthetics. For one thing, no 
serious critic or artist would ever change their practice based on such 
results. Instead, expert aestheticians are intuitively tuned to subtle 
factors like intensity, completeness, and coherence, which are difficult 
to study experimentally. But this was 54 years ago — can we now say 
Dickie was too pessimistic about the future of the field? Following 
other contemporary authors (e.g. Kubovy, 2000; Holmes and Zanker, 
2012), I argue that many problems remain. My aim is to organize 
some of these valid and interesting criticisms in a novel way. As we 
will see, there are problems with both axes. 
 
Figure 1. Psychophysics (A) and the quasi-psychophysical approach to 
aesthetic science (B). 
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2. What Goes on the Y Axis? 
Words like ‘aesthetics’ and ‘aesthetic experience’ could be described 
as ‘grandiose’. Aesthetic experience is supposedly something rare and 
wonderful. Art, beauty, and truth are esteemed as the ‘higher 
pinnacles’ of the human mind. Aesthetic experience is one of those 
mental jewels that supposedly separates us from the beasts (see 
Jacobsen et al., 2006, for evidence that this is not just anthropocentric 
bias). Religions allude to deep connections between beauty, per-
fection, morality, and the divine. Philosophers have also considered 
the nature of beauty for millennia. Emanuel Kant (1724–1804) 
identified aesthetic experience as involving a ‘sense of the sublime’ 
and ‘disinterested fascination’ (as described in Shimamura, 2012). 
According to Kant, aesthetic emotions are rare and qualitatively 
different to ordinary ones. While most emotions are about satisfying 
homeostatic drives, aesthetic emotions do not compel action so 
urgently (although they certainly inspire us to create and understand 
art). 
Modern accounts in psychological science do not always shy away 
from the richness of aesthetic experience. For example, Markovic 
(2012) describes the state of aesthetic rapture as an intense fascination 
with the object of appreciation, in a rare and special transcendent 
moment. He links aesthetic rapture to other hard-to-describe mental 
states like flow experience (being so engrossed we blissfully forget 
about time and the narrative self — Csikszentmihalyi, 1991), mindful-
ness (a simultaneously wakeful and peaceful state sometimes attained 
though mediation — Langer and Moldoveanu, 2000), or peak experi-
ence (a vivid, enthusiastic participation in life associated with personal 
fulfilment — Maslow, 1972). 
Let’s look at another attempt to put aesthetic experience into words. 
Kubovy (2000) lists the following six components of a prototypical 
aesthetic response to art: 
1) Attention is firmly fixed upon heterogeneous but interrelated 
components of a pattern. 
2) Where there is little interference from potentially distracting 
stimuli like environmental noise or bodily sensations. 
3) Where the viewer is conscious of the relationship between the 
object and artist or object and culture which created it. 
4) Is dominated by intense feelings or emotions. 
5) All aspects of the experience are transparently related to each 
other. 
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188 A.D.J.  MAKIN 
6) May have a sense of make believe, in which the viewer is 
immersed to the extent that they do not think of the artwork as a 
material object. 
These valuable accounts describe something about the human mind 
and experience, and they are of interest to psychologists, even though 
they are not stereotypically scientific. I think it is uncontroversial to 
say aesthetic rapture cannot be studied with the reductive quasi-
psychophysical approach. For one thing, it is virtually impossible to 
evoke these kinds of intense emotions in the lab on repeated trials with 
well controlled stimuli. In all likelihood, the participants experience 
absolutely zero aesthetic rapture at any time during such experiments 
(Figure 1B). 
Superficially, this conclusion seems to be in stark contrast to a claim 
in Palmer, Schloss and Sammartino (2013), who proposed that we 
have ‘some kind of aesthetic experience to nearly everything we see’. 
However, Palmer makes the vital distinction between ‘aesthetics with 
a capital A’ and ‘aesthetics with a lower case a’. The latter refers to 
more ordinary preferences and reactions, which need not be intensely 
emotional. If we can study anything about aesthetic experience using 
the quasi-psychophysical approach, it is only aesthetics with a lower 
case ‘a’. 
Let’s consider a final example. Pelowski and Akiba (2011) propose 
that aesthetic experience is NOT always about blissfully losing our-
selves in moments of sensory perfection or cognitive mastery, but 
about challenging the ego. They propose that art can disrupt and attack 
our self-schema. This is followed by denial and resistance (experi-
enced as negative tensions and anxiety) and then surrender to a new 
worldview (sometimes experienced as a tearful epiphany). Pelowski 
(2015) explored this model empirically, and found that 36–43% of 
visitors to Rothko exhibitions reported some inclination to cry. How-
ever, a Rothko painting is the opposite of a controlled stimulus — it is 
a labyrinth of interacting visual and semantic dimensions which 
cannot easily be listed, isolated, and quantified. Furthermore, the 
participants probably entered the ‘experiment’ with prior expectations 
and opinions about Rothko. It is instructive that Pelowski (2015) had 
to move a long way from the reductive psychophysical approach in 
order to record aesthetic emotions of any intensity. 
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3. Difficulty with Studying Ordinary Emotions 
As well as rare and special aesthetic emotions, the full aesthetic 
response also involves perceptual processing, cognitive appraisal, 
cultural knowledge, and also more ordinary emotions, like happiness 
or surprise (Leder et al., 2004; Markovic, 2012). So, even if aesthetic 
rapture cannot be reliably evoked in the lab, perhaps we can study the 
other emotional responses instead? For example, can we vary some 
aspect of the stimuli in a controlled way (X axis) and measure happi-
ness (Y axis)? Next I will argue that studying ordinary emotions is 
also very difficult with the psychophysical approach. 
Mauss and Robinson (2009) focus on theoretical and methodol-
ogical issues in emotion research. One idea is that there are core 
emotions that are culturally universal in humans and evident in other 
species. Core emotions are supposedly triggered by specific circum-
stances which were common to our ancestors (such as loss, achieve-
ment, frustration, or assault). Furthermore, core emotions activate a 
unique set of neural, hormonal, and cardiovascular responses (e.g. 
amygdala activation, adrenaline release, heart rate increase), they 
produce distinct facial expressions (e.g. smiling, frowning, snarling), 
and finally, they have stereotypical behavioural consequences (e.g. 
running, shouting, hiding). There may be 15 core human emotions: 
Amusement, Anger, Contempt, Contentment, Disgust, Embarrassment, 
Excitement, Fear, Guilt, Pride, Relief, Sadness, Satisfaction, Sensory 
Pleasure, and Shame (Ekman, 1999). These are supposedly distinct, 
brief, and automatic reactions to certain antecedent events. Core 
emotions are thus different from moods, which are emotion-laden but 
more persistent (see Saarimäki et al., 2015, and Sauter et al., 2010, for 
recent work on basic emotions). 
An alternative to the core emotion account is the dimensional 
account. We can imagine a 3D graph: on the respective axes we have 
arousal (low to high), valence (negative to positive), and approach-
avoid inclination (tendency to move towards or away). Each 
emotional state can be described as a point in that 3D space. For 
example, fear is characterized by high arousal, negative valence, and 
avoidance (i.e. running from an enemy). Anger is also high arousal 
and negative valence, but with high approach inclination (i.e. attack-
ing an enemy). Contentment would involve low arousal, positive 
valence, and no strong tendency to approach or avoid anything. Mauss 
and Robinson (2009) claim that there is more evidence for the 
dimensional account than for the core emotion account. Perhaps the 
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190 A.D.J.  MAKIN 
two can be reconciled if emotion space is uneven and heterogeneous: 
there could be certain regions which are frequently revisited, and these 
regions are signposted by the core emotion words. 
We need not have a final classification scheme in place before we 
can study emotions scientifically. There are various methodologies for 
diagnosing or ‘reading out’ a person’s emotional state. These include 
questionnaires, self-report, heart rate measurement, galvanic skin 
responses, pupil dilation, and facial expression analysis. These 
measures all have strengths and weaknesses. However, these different 
measures of emotion are poorly correlated: for example, pupil dilation 
is not strongly correlated with self-reported arousal. Even worse, they 
are not diagnostic: I cannot conclusively claim that you are not happy 
because you are not smiling, or that you must be happy because you 
are smiling. 
Researchers studying emotion often use very potent stimuli, such as 
the International Affective Pictures (IAPs) or fear conditioning where 
sounds are paired with very aversive electric shocks (LeDoux, 1998). 
Emotion research which uses these stimuli is difficult enough. How-
ever, in aesthetic science we have an additional problem: we want to 
use precisely controlled visual stimuli, which differ from each other in 
specific and quantifiable ways. This means the emotional difference 
between our conditions is miniscule. The kinds of images used in 
empirical aesthetics probably produce only sub-threshold and sporadic 
emotional responses at most. For example, it is not likely that they 
would elicit strong states of arousal, with increase in heart rate, 
adrenaline release, and sweating, etc. We are still very much in the 
realms of Figure 1B, where the Y value is zero on virtually every trial. 
In other words, we cannot evoke a ‘hot’ emotional reaction with care-
fully controlled visual stimuli, on multiple trials, across many 
participants. 
Before moving on, it is worth briefly mentioning another account, 
which is highly relevant to scientific aesthetics. Barrett (2012) asks 
whether ‘Emotions are real’. The reflexive answer is ‘yes’, but this 
seems less obvious after deeper inspection. She begins with the 
ontological analysis of the categories ‘flower’ and ‘weed’: there is no 
objective, physical difference between plants that distinguishes a 
flower from a weed. Should we say that flowers and weeds are 
illusory? No: surely our culturally shared knowledge about gardens 
makes sense of the words ‘flower’ and ‘weed’. For one thing, these 
words suggest different appropriate actions, weeds are to be discarded, 
flowers admired and cherished. Changes in heart rate or adrenaline 
Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) I
m
pr
int
 A
ca
de
m
ic 
20
16
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nly
 --
 n
ot
 fo
r r
ep
ro
du
cti
on
 
 AESTHETIC  SCIENCE  &  AESTHETIC  EXPERIENCE 191 
release can also be objectively measured (like plants) and, in this case, 
internally discriminated and perceived. However, Barrett proposes 
that we understand and interpret these events using our learned 
categories and our full semantic knowledge (ibid.). Like ‘flower’ and 
‘weed’, conceptual categories such as ‘fear’ and ‘anger’ are complex, 
social constructions, learned and elaborated through countless con-
versations and cultural interchanges. An emotion is properly under-
stood as more than a physiological response or fixed action sequence, 
it is also the full range of semantic and conceptual knowledge which 
we use to make sense of these bodily events. Barrett uses the term 
‘emotional gestalt’ to refer to this cognitive and affective whole 
(ibid.). This theoretical position allows for near infinite flexibility in 
emotional experience. People in different cultures could have quite 
different emotional gestalts, because they have different emotional 
words and categories, a different history of ideas about the kind of 
actions appropriate in certain situations, and so on. It would be 
interesting to analyse aesthetic experience using the concept of 
emotional gestalts, although that is beyond the scope of this paper. 
4. Cold Evaluations and Preferences 
We have seen that it is very difficult to evoke either special aesthetic 
emotions or hot emotions using well controlled stimuli on repeated 
trials. This leaves us with studying cold evaluations or preferences. 
Fortunately, people can easily evaluate things without feeling a hot 
emotional reaction. I can judge that winning a prize is positive, and 
losing my wallet is negative, without actually feeling triumph and 
frustration. This is presumably what happens in the vast majority of 
experiments in empirical aesthetics that use the psychophysical 
approach, even if we sometimes interpret results in terms of ‘affective 
processing’. 
It is easy to find examples in modern scientific aesthetics. We know 
that there are reliable preferences for particular colours. People 
typically like blue and greenish-blue and dislike brownish-yellows 
(Palmer and Schloss, 2010). Certain colour combinations are 
harmonious, and some people have a preference for harmony (Schloss 
and Palmer, 2011). People rate curved edges as more attractive than 
angular, spiky edges (Bar and Neta, 2007; Bertamini et al., 2016). 
People prefer symmetrical arrangements to random arrangements 
(Eisenman, 1967; Jacobsen and Höfel, 2002; Makin, Pecchinenda and 
Bertamini, 2012), and have a preference for mid-range fractals 
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192 A.D.J.  MAKIN 
(Spehar et al., 2003). In all these experiments, the authors varied a 
particular aspect of the simple stimuli, and measured preference in one 
way or another. Often, participants simply rated preference for each 
presentation on a scale (e.g. unattractive to attractive, or pleasant to 
unpleasant). I presume participants were making cold evaluations in 
all these experiments. When Palmer talked of ‘aesthetics with a lower 
case a’, he was partly referring to the fact that we are studying cold, 
cognitive evaluations, not hot emotional reactions. 
So, we have found something workable for the Y axis: namely cold 
evaluations. This may be an underwhelming and mundane part of the 
aesthetic experience when contrasted with glamourous things like 
‘aesthetic rapture’, ‘immersion in make believe worlds’, or ‘sense of 
the sublime’, but at least it is something we can precisely measure in 
the lab with controlled stimuli!1 
5. What Goes on the X Axis? 
Facing Up to the ‘Gestalt Nightmare’ 
So far we have concentrated on the Y axis, and asked which aspects of 
the aesthetic experience can be evoked in the lab, quantified, and 
measured. We now move onto the X axis, and consider issues with 
stimuli which we sometimes use in empirical aesthetics. 
Can we learn anything about real-world preferences by measuring 
preference for one visual dimension at a time? What if features fail to 
summate in a predictable way? For example, we know that people like 
blue more than brown (Palmer and Schloss, 2010). But surely findings 
like this can always be turned upside down when blue and brown are 
properties of other objects, not just patches of colour? After all, 
nobody wants a blue banana, and everybody likes brown chocolate. 
Holmes and Zanker (2012) state the problem like this: 
[The reductionist approach] allows more precise questions about the 
relationship between some feature of the stimulus and the consciously 
articulated preferences to be explored in a highly controlled manner. 
However, as observed by Arnheim (1974), the aesthetic experience is 
rather fragile and typically relates to the gestalt, or whole, rather than 
the sum of any isolated parts meaning that a reductionist approach will 
                                                          
1  Of course, some researchers would object here that aesthetics-with-a-lower-case-a is not 
their plan b — it is interesting in its own right to understand the ubiquitous preferences 
that enhance everyday life. 
Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) I
m
pr
int
 A
ca
de
m
ic 
20
16
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nly
 --
 n
ot
 fo
r r
ep
ro
du
cti
on
 
 AESTHETIC  SCIENCE  &  AESTHETIC  EXPERIENCE 193 
never be able to explain the effects of the complex interaction of many 
individual features on the aesthetic evaluation of the stimulus. (p. 426) 
This problem could be called the ‘gestalt nightmare’.2 The reductive 
psychophysical approach assumes that there are many stimulus 
dimensions which alter preference in a lawful way. We can do experi-
ments to discover these laws. However, the approach tacitly assumes 
that all these dimensions are orthogonal, and all effects on preference 
are independent. This second assumption is totally unrealistic. It is 
more likely that stimulus-preference laws are modulated, turned, and 
twisted whenever another dimension is added to the stimuli. 
This is particularly important, because the human aesthetic faculty is 
tuned to gestalts: we are impressed by the precise balance and inter-
play of elements, and comparatively uninterested in the elements in 
isolation. For example, the aesthetic appeal of music comes from the 
relationship between the individual notes, melodies, and lyrics, etc. It 
would be totally meaningless to play each component sound 
separately, obtain a preference rating, then sum all the preferences. 
However, the reductive approach sometimes implies that studying the 
isolated parts is somehow step one on an ambitious research project. 
Dickie (1962), Kubovy (2000), and many others have talked about the 
gestalt nightmare in one way or another. However, as a community, 
we have still not found an unproblematic way to transcend it. 
I have conducted a short experiment which illustrates the gestalt 
nightmare. Participants first evaluated patterns which varied only in 
one dimension, 1) symmetry or random, 2) blue or brown, 3) curved 
or angular (Figure 2A). They were then shown patterns which 
included all three dimensions (Figure 2B). Do findings from the one-
dimensional experiments generalize to the three-dimensional experi-
ment? For instance, if people like blue more than brown coloured 
patches, will this translate into liking blue in complex patterns as 
well? In the same spirit, we can test whether individual differences 
transfer from 1D to 3D experiments. Does a participant who really 
liked blue when colour was the only dimension remain a blue-lover 
when there are other features available as well? Although this experi-
ment alone does not conclusively tell us how much to worry about the 
gestalt nightmare, it does help illustrate the nature of the problem, and 
suggests some recurring variants. 
                                                          
2  Professor Stephen Palmer (personal communication) suggested the phrase ‘gestalt 
nightmare’. 
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194 A.D.J.  MAKIN 
 
Figure 2. A) There were three separate 1D experiments, where stimuli 
varied on a single dimension only: Regularity, Shape or Colour. B) Stimuli 
from the subsequent 3D experiment. Here all three dimensions were 
available, and all could contribute to preference. 
Co
py
rig
ht
 (c
) I
m
pr
int
 A
ca
de
m
ic 
20
16
Fo
r p
er
so
na
l u
se
 o
nly
 --
 n
ot
 fo
r r
ep
ro
du
cti
on
 
 AESTHETIC  SCIENCE  &  AESTHETIC  EXPERIENCE 195 
6. Method 
6.1. Participants and Apparatus 
42 participants from the University of Liverpool (age 18–25, 4 males, 
7 right-handed) were involved in the study. All had normal or 
corrected to normal vision. The study had local ethics committee 
approval and was conducted in accordance with the declaration of 
Helsinki (revised 2008). The session lasted about 25 minutes. The 
experiment was programmed in Python using open source PsychoPy 
libraries (Peirce, 2007). 
6.2. Procedure and Stimuli 
The experiment had four parts. First there were three separate one-
dimensional experiments (1D). All participants then completed the 
three-dimensional experiment (3D). Trial structure is shown in Figure 
3. The order of the 1D experiments was counterbalanced across 
participants, then all participants completed the 3D experiment last. 
6.3. 1D Experiments 
The regularity experiment varied the arrangement of the dots 
(symmetrical or random). Following numerous previous studies, we 
predicted that symmetry would be preferred (Makin, Pecchinenda and 
Bertamini, 2012). The symmetrical patterns had four folds. The 
random patterns had the same average number of dots, but with no 
systematic spatial relationship between elements. The program 
generated the patterns afresh on every trial using the same algorithm. 
No pattern was ever presented twice and no two participants saw the 
same set of patterns. 
The shape experiment varied the angularity or roundness of a small 
black solid shape. This was composed of several overlapping squares 
or circles, which varied in size. Previous work suggests that people 
prefer rounded edges to squared, angular edges (e.g. Bar and Neta, 
2007), either because the angles signify threat and risk, or because the 
curved edges are positively evaluated (Bertamini et al., 2016). Again, 
the program generated these shapes afresh on every trial. 
Finally, the colour experiment varied the colour of a central patch, 
either light blue or light brown. These two colours were chosen to be 
approximately similar to the most and least preferred colours found by 
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196 A.D.J.  MAKIN 
Palmer and Schloss (2010). The size of the patch was varied randomly 
from trial to trial to provide some extra variety. 
On each of the 1D experiments, 20 trials were shown, with 10 
examples from the hypothetically positive category, and 10 from the 
hypothetically negative category. Patterns were presented for 3 secs. 
All patterns were framed by an identical white circle with a black 
border, 11.25 cm in diameter. This was followed by a rating scale, 
which varied from 0 to 100. The screen read: ‘How much did you like 
the pattern?’ The low end was marked ‘not at all’, the high end was 
marked ‘extremely’ (Figure 3). For each participant, the mean rating 
scores of the 10 positive patterns and the 10 negative patterns was 
obtained. 
 
Figure 3. Trial structure and design. 
6.4. 3D Experiment 
The 3D experiment was always completed after the 1D experiments. 
Stimuli were novel, but represented a combination of the features used 
in the 1D experiments: patterns were symmetrical or random, made of 
rounded or angular sub-units, and were either blue or brown. The 
same basic algorithms used in the 1D experiments were used again to 
arrange symmetry and generate element shape. The same blue and 
brown colours were used. There were 80 trials in this experiment, with 
10 repeats of each condition (Figure 2B). The mean preference ratings 
from each condition were obtained. 
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We can think of the stimuli in the 3D experiment as including a 0–3 
of aesthetic virtues (Figure 2B). Even ignoring the results of the 1D 
experiments, it is interesting to consider how these virtues might inter-
act with each other. Will this always be some kind of summation, or 
will there be complicated interactions? 
7. Results 
7.1. 3D Experiment 
It is instructive to begin with the results of the 3D experiment. Prefer-
ences in all 8 conditions of the 2 (Regularity) x 2 (Element shape) x 2 
(Colour) design are shown in Figure 4A. The other panels in Figure 4 
show the same data, but collapsed over one or more factors because 
this makes some results easier to visualize. Participants preferred the 
symmetrical to the random patterns (F(1,41) = 97.091, p < 0.001, 
partial 2 = 0.703, Figure 4D), and the blue patterns to the brown 
patterns (F(1,41) = 25.531, p < 0.001, partial 2 = 0.384, Figure 4E). 
There was no main effect of element shape (F(1,41) < 1, Figure 4F). 
There was no three-way interaction between all factors (F(1,41) < 
1). The Regularity x Colour interaction approached significance 
(F(1,41) = 3.618, p = 0.064, partial 2 = 0.081, Figure 4B), while the 
Regularity x Element shape interaction was clear (F(1,41) = 17.024, 
p < 0.001, partial 2 = 0.293, Figure 4C). When patterns were random, 
people preferred spiky, angular edges (t(41) = –3.114, p = 0.003), but 
when patterns were symmetrical, there was a trend in the other 
direction (t(41) = 1.637, p = 0.109). 
7.2. 1D Experiments 
Results of the 1D experiments are shown in Figure 5. As expected, 
participants again preferred symmetry to random (t(41) = 11.828, 
p < 0.001, Figure 5A) and blue to brown (t(41) = 8.925, p < 0.001, 
Figure 5B). Numerically, people preferred spiky to smooth (the oppo-
site of the expected results), although this was not significant (t(41) = 
–1.725, p = 0.092, Figure 5C). 
We can now compare effects from these 1D experiments with the 
equivalent main effects from the 3D experiment. Does each 1D result 
tell us something about preference for richer stimuli, where there are 
multiple dimensions which could potentially be considered? 
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Figure 4. Results of the 3D experiment. A, preference in all conditions. 
B–F, same results averaged over one on more factors. Error bars = +/- 1 
S.E.M. ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. 
First, preference for symmetry over random arrangements was 
explored. Results are shown in Figure 5D. These data were analysed 
with a Regularity (Symmetry, Random) x Context (1D, 3D) repeated 
measures ANOVA. Although people always preferred symmetry, this 
was slightly larger in the 1D experiment than the 3D experiment, 
resulting in a Regularity x Context interaction (F(1,41) = 8.438, p = 
0.006, partial 2 = 0.171). 
Next, preference for blue over brown was analysed in the same way. 
Results are shown in Figure 5E. Preference for blue was found in both 
experiments, but was greatly reduced in the 3D experiment. This was 
confirmed with a Colour (Blue, Brown) x Context (1D, 3D) repeated 
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measures ANOVA. There was a main effect of Context (F(1,41) = 
14.245, p < 0.001, partial 2 = 0.258), and a Context x Colour inter-
action (F(1,41) = 22.273, p < 0.001, partial 2 = 0.352). 
Finally, we examined the effect of context on element shape (Figure 
5F). The only significant result was a main effect of Context, with 
higher ratings in the 3D experiment (F(1,41) = 44.437, p < 0.001, 
partial 2 = 0.520). 
 
Figure 5. A–C show results of the 1D experiments. D–F show results of 1D 
experiments and the equivalent main effect from the 3D experiment. Error 
bars = +/- 1 S.E.M. *** p < 0.001. 
7.3. Individual Differences 
People have different preferences. The generalizability of individual 
differences can be estimated by correlating preferences in the 1D and 
3D experiments. Results are shown in Figure 6. People who rated 
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symmetry highly in the 1D experiment also tended to give a high 
rating for symmetry in the 3D experiment (r = 0.655, p < 0.001, 
Figure 6A). There was an apparent transfer of individual differences 
in colour preference as well, although this did not reach significance 
with a two-tailed test (r = 0.291, p = 0.061, Figure 6B). There was no 
correlation for element shape, although the relationship was positive 
(r = 0.227, p = 0.148, Figure 6C). 
8. Discussion 
I presume that most people working on empirical aesthetics would 
agree that we can never predict how much someone will like a piece 
of art by breaking it into separate visual parts, and then measuring 
their preference for each part in isolation. However, the reductive 
psychophysical approach to aesthetic science is still very common. So 
how scary is the gestalt nightmare? The experiments reported here 
provide some preliminary insights. 
Perhaps there are common variations of the gestalt nightmare, which 
keep recurring? In the 1D experiments, preference for symmetry was 
stronger than preference for blue. The preference for symmetry 
remained at about the same magnitude in the 3D experiment, but the 
preference for blue was substantially reduced. Here the stronger 
factor dominated preferences when there are many factors available. 
This kind of masking is probably a very common variant of the 
gestalt nightmare. If we have very impoverished stimuli, then we may 
find quite substantial and statistically significant effects on preference. 
However, these effects may vanish if more potent dimensions are 
added, but would still be found if less potent dimensions were added. 
For multidimensional stimuli, preference judgments will likely be 
dominated by a few salient dimensions, and otherwise important 
factors that may significantly affect preference when tested in isola-
tion will be drowned out. For example, if we added extreme positive 
or negative semantic content as a second dimension, the aesthetic 
effect of colour or symmetry might disappear completely (because the 
participant’s aesthetic faculties are totally absorbed with the obvious 
valence difference). This is a particularly important consideration for 
empirical aesthetics, because we typically measure low magnitude 
effects on preference (symmetry, colour, curvature), while real art 
often includes very potent factors that are hard to quantify (ideological 
messages, extreme positive or negative valence, challenge to stylistic 
norms, and so on). 
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Figure 6. Correlations between individual preference magnitudes in 1D and 
3D experiments. Each data point is a participant. 
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There was also an interesting interaction between regularity and 
element shape in the 3D experiment. When the patterns were 
symmetrical, there was a trend in favour of curved over angular 
shapes, but when patterns were random, people significantly preferred 
angular shapes to curved. This points to another potential variant of 
the nightmare. What mattered was not the absolute valence, but the 
agreement between valence of different dimensions of the stimuli. 
People do not just look at an image and award a point for every part 
with positive valence, and subtract a point for every part that has 
negative valence. Instead, consistency between different parts of the 
image is good, even if that ‘consistency’ means double negative 
valence. This relates to the idea of representational fit: for instance, if 
an artist wants to paint a battle scene, they might use disharmonious, 
clashing colours. Colour clash on its own may be unattractive, but 
here aesthetic merit comes from deliberate congruence between 
dimensions of the work at different levels (Palmer, Scloss and 
Sammartino, 2013). This could be another common variant of the 
gestalt nightmare. It should be noted that this congruence wasn’t 
found with the Colour-Symmetry condition. Here the effects of colour 
and symmetry were approximately additive (participants did not like 
random, brown patterns for instance). This shows again that any 
apparent aesthetic law, such as the value of congruence, is potentially 
plastic. 
In summary, the hyper-dimensional human preference space may 
not be so tightly tangled and folded that we should abandon the 
reductive approach completely, but there are substantial problems. 
9. Gestalt Nightmare and 
Different Research Designs 
The gestalt nightmare still haunts other studies which use slight 
variations of the reductive psychophysical approach. For example, the 
X axis is not always an objective dimension of the stimuli. Sometimes 
we measure the relationship between two kinds of subjective rating. 
For example, Berlyne proposed a lawful relationship between sub-
jective arousal and subjective preference, where people like mid-level 
arousal (Berlyne, 1971). This is still an example of a reductive 
psychophysical approach. We are still varying just one dimension at a 
time, albeit a subjective dimension. Again, there is no guarantee that 
addition of other dimensions will leave the lawful relationship 
unchanged. 
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A nice recent example of this interaction was reported by Albrecht 
and Carbon (2014). They reviewed the fluency model, which suggests 
that people are sensitive to the speed and efficiency of their own 
perceptual and cognitive processing. Generally, fluent processing 
engenders positive emotions, which are sometimes attributed to the 
merit of the stimuli (Reber, 2012). However, fluency was found to 
amplify pre-existing valence, so visual fluency made already-negative 
images more negative, and already-positive images more positive. 
The gestalt nightmare is still a problem if the experiment has more 
than one factor and an interaction is hypothesized a priori. We never 
know how this interaction will be further twisted by the addition of 
another factor. For example, we cannot be sure that the fluency by 
valence interaction found by Albrecht and Carbon (2014) would 
remain if something else was included as a third factor. The mere use 
of a multifactorial design does not immediately save us from the 
gestalt nightmare. 
Despite these considerations, the gestalt nightmare is probably most 
acute when we plot lawful relationships between discrete, objective 
stimulus properties and subjective preferences (Figure 1B). It perhaps 
fades somewhat when plotting the relationship between basic psychol-
ogical states (Berlyne, 1971). Finally, the gestalt nightmare may not 
be relevant at all to research that examines correlations between 
higher-level components of the aesthetic experience, like psychol-
ogical tension and the inclination to cry (e.g. Pelowski, 2015). These 
‘top-level’ constructs can be conceptualized as emotional gestalts 
(Barrett, 2012). Emotional gestalts are viable entities for empirical 
measurement, even though they have a very complicated internal 
structure and many unconscious components. Aesthetic science can 
possibly avoid the gestalt nightmare by measuring psychodynamics at 
this level. 
Palmer and Schloss (2010) reported a mini-gestalt nightmare. The 
lawful relations between colour and preference were modulated by 
brightness. Specifically, preference for yellows was affected by 
brightness, but this was not found for other colours. Palmer and 
Schloss provided evidence that colour preferences are caused by 
association with objects that have a pre-existing valence. Dark yellow 
resembles faeces or vomit, while light yellow often reminds us of 
objects with positive valence, like the sun. They found that colour 
preferences were dependent on the strength of the colour–object 
associations. Objects are combinations of features, and preferences are 
targeted towards familiar objects. By studying objects, empirical 
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aesthetics is partly relieved from the impossible burden of measuring 
preference for every conceivable dimension and every combination. 
This may reduce the gestalt nightmare. However, I would tentatively 
argue that it does not eliminate it. Preferences for objects can be docu-
mented, but any systematic result is likely to be modulated when 
another feature is added to the display, such as composition, 
familiarity, or artistic intentions. 
Indeed, we should also note that ‘additional dimensions’ need not be 
properties of the objects in the strictest sense. For example, mere 
familiarity alters preference (Zajonc, 1968), while the dynamics of 
prototype formation and innovation play out over decades (Carbon, 
2010; Cutting, 2003). History and fashion can strongly influence 
preference for a particular design, and the effects of history on 
preference may interact with the intrinsic properties in unpredictable 
ways. The gestalt nightmare has a temporal dimension. 
There is growing interest in understanding the neural basis of 
aesthetic experience (Chatterjee, 2011). Leading contemporary 
researchers such as Leder and Nadal (2014) are optimistic that neuro-
science can be increasingly integrated with empirical aesthetics in 
future. Others are more sceptical (Conway and Rehding, 2013). I will 
sidestep the broader debate to focus on a specific point. The gestalt 
nightmare arises whenever there are very few independent variables, 
and it is not remedied be recording high-dimensional data sets with a 
lot of dependent variables (although this may be desirable for other 
reasons). In neuroaesthetics we get an explosion of dependent 
variables, but experiments may still have relatively few independent 
variables. The gestalt nightmare remains as it was in old-fashioned 
preference rating experiments. 
We can illustrate this with research that has measured activation of 
the facial muscle responsible for smiling (Zygomaticus Major, ZM). 
Research has found weak ZM activation when participants observe 
symmetrical patterns (Makin et al., 2012, Experiment 1), prototypical 
dot patterns (Winkielman et al., 2006), and attractive faces (Gerger et 
al., 2011). ZM recordings tell us about the latency of the emotional 
response, and therefore contain more information than verbal prefer-
ence reports. However, the extra time-dimension in our data set says 
nothing about the consequences of including a new independent 
variable in our experimental design (indeed, Experiment 2 of Makin et 
al., 2012, found that the effect could be reversed if response-key 
labels were switched). 
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Of course, all psychophysics is reductionist in a sense: we study 
motion, colour, and contrast perception by putting participants in a 
chin rest, in a dark room in front of a screen at a fixed distance, and 
isolating and varying one aspect of the stimuli at a time. Would it be 
legitimate to complain that these results tell us nothing about complex 
real-world stimuli? No, that would miss the point: the aim of psycho-
physics is to probe the discriminatory limits of the visual system, and 
relate this to facts about optics and neurobiology of the eye and visual 
brain. In scientific aesthetics there is some aspiration to generalize 
beyond the dimensions tested in the lab, and find laws of aesthetics 
which help us understand the appeal of art and nature. We are not 
trying to push the system to make the smallest and most precise 
aesthetic discrimination possible! 
10. Attractive Faces 
Human faces are gestalts that provoke strong emotional responses, and 
they are occasionally very beautiful. What lessons can facial attract-
iveness research provide for scientific aesthetics? Facial attraction is 
about truthful indicators of health and fertility, with some fine-tuning 
depending on our current reproductive strategy (Little, Jones and 
DeBruine, 2011). Amongst other things, we like smooth skin, reddish 
colouration (from carotenoids), approximate symmetry, and proto-
typicality. Males are attracted to feminine features (shaped by oestro-
gen), females sometimes like masculinized faces (shaped by testos-
terone), although this is modulated by the menstrual cycle and current 
partnerships. Aesthetic responses to other objects are less obviously 
linked to natural selection. 
Tsao and Livingstone (2008) review the neuroscience of face per-
ception. They claim that faces are processed holistically and 
immediately, and this is explained by an early, automatic detection 
stage, like a template that finds upright eye-nose-mouth arrangements 
in the retinal image. Other shapes are not captured by innate detectors 
that gate dedicated upstream circuitry. This is another reason why 
facial beauty might be a separate category. 
I tentatively suggest that facial attractiveness is tractable with the 
reductive approach. Faces vary on (relatively) few discrete dimen-
sions, so we can work through multidimensional space exhaustively 
(although no doubt this is still a huge challenge). Natural selection has 
rationalized our feelings about faces (from the genes point of view). 
Consequently, face preferences are probably more uniform and 
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predictable, so effects (and new hypotheses) can be discovered more 
easily. Studying other kinds of beauty is a different game altogether. 
11. Summary and Conclusions 
Empirical aesthetics is popular and growing. The reductive psycho-
physical approach remains common. We vary a property of the 
stimuli, and measure some aesthetic reaction. We have seen that there 
are very significant problems with this approach, which can be 
categorized as problems on the X and Y dimensions. Although the 
paradigmatic aesthetic experience involves strong emotions, fascina-
tion, and aesthetic rapture, it is nearly impossible to evoke these 
feelings in the lab, especially on multiple trials with well controlled 
stimuli. Most of this applies to studying ‘hot’ emotions generally. We 
thus have to resort to ‘aesthetics with a lower case a’, and study cold 
preferences and evaluations. Now we have problems with the X axis. 
We cannot expect to discover lawful relations between stimulus attri-
butes and preference, and then generalize these findings far beyond 
the initial stimulus set (at least not without further justification). The 
gestalt nightmare is real: the vast number of stimulus dimensions 
which systematically alter preference are not orthogonal and 
independent, and the reductive approach tacitly assumes that they are. 
To avoid any misunderstanding at this point, we should quickly 
acknowledge the reductive approach as only one part of a broader 
research programme. There have been very interesting attempts to 
apply general theories from cognitive neuroscience to understand art 
(Ramachandran and Hirstein, 1999; Redies, 2007; Van de Cruys and 
Wagemans, 2011; Zeki, 2002). Others have pointed out that artists are 
experts on vision. They have learned which cues carry compelling 
visual impressions (e.g. contours, occlusions), and what can be 
ignored (e.g. precise optics of shadows and reflections). Cavanagh 
(2005) claimed that ‘paintings and drawings are a 40,000-year record 
of experiments in visual neuroscience’. There is also valuable cross-
talk between science and modern artists (http://www.gestaltrevision. 
be/en/). 
The reductive approach will sometimes find a basic law which is 
fairly robust. For example, there are reliable preferences for compo-
sitional arrangements (Palmer, Gardner and Wickens, 2008) and 
colours (Palmer and Schloss, 2010). People like symmetry in abstract 
patterns (Jacobsen and Höfel, 2002), smoothed rather than sharp edges 
(Bar and Neta, 2007), and certain types of fractal structure (Spehar et 
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al., 2003). Sometimes people like stimuli which are fluently processed 
(Reber, 2012) or have the medium arousal potential (Berlyne, 1971), 
or which have been targets rather than distractors on previous visual 
search tasks (Fenske and Raymond, 2006). These regularities have 
been discovered with the reductive psychophysical approach, and they 
represent genuine insights. It would be too extreme to say that these 
studies tell us nothing about aesthetics: they do, but only in a rather 
limited sense. 
We can use the Turing test rationale to get a handle on how 
important these limitations are. If we really understand aesthetics, we 
should be able to program a computer to make art which humans find 
appealing, using explicit production rules inspired by empirical 
findings. Computers can indeed run pattern-generation algorithms 
with surprising and appealing visual results. For instance, dynamic 
screensavers are sometimes fascinating. But do we credit the pro-
grammer or the program? At present, we are a long way from simula-
ting the judgments of a human artist, even if computers can mediate 
between the artist/programmer and artwork in increasingly complex 
ways (Chamberlain, Mullin and Wagemans, 2015). 
Compositional rules validated in empirical experiments may help a 
photographer produce desirable photographs, and knowledge of colour 
preferences may help a web designer make an attractive website. 
However, we are certainly not at a stage where empirical aesthetics 
provides a recipe book which can lead to successful art and design. 
Empirical aesthetics can provide tips to help a complete amateur, but 
not much more. In fact, these tips may lead in completely the wrong 
direction, because they will always interact unpredictably, and any 
trained artist or designer will probably be able see these aesthetic 
blunders immediately (e.g. Dickie, 1962). 
This was illustrated in an amusing way by the artists Komar and 
Melamid: they telephoned a sample of around 1,000 Americans and 
surveyed their preferences on many dimensions (favourite colour, 
second favourite colour, prefer domestic or wild animals, and so on), 
and then proceeded to paint ‘America’s favourite painting’. The 
resulting ‘art by democracy’ is not highly rated (http://awp.diaart. 
org/km/).3 Good art and design requires the careful and precise inter-
                                                          
3  The 2016 Eurovision song contest revisited the humour of Komar and Melamid 
(https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aMgW54HBOS0). 
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play of every visual and semantic element, and this precise balance 
cannot be dismantled and understood bit by bit (e.g. Kubovy, 2000). 
Is all this just a straw-man argument — am I overstating the case of 
my opponent? Not really, because there is no vocal advocate of 
reductive aesthetic science who denies the existence of its limitations. 
At the same time, the research community continues to publish new 
papers using the reductive, quasi-psychophysical approach, as if the 
problems are small and solving them can be postponed indefinitely. I 
claim here that the problems are substantial, and need to be faced. 
12. Could a New Aesthetic Science 
Say More About Aesthetic Experience? 
We can put the conclusions of this paper into a single sentence: 
aesthetic experience is fundamentally about hot emotional reactions to 
wholes, but empirical aesthetics is stuck measuring cold evaluation of 
parts. I propose that the future of scientific aesthetics depends on how 
successfully we can transcend the reductive, quasi-psychophysical 
approach. 
Furthermore, dwelling on these problems is a worthwhile exercise 
because it sharpens our sense of what an ideal psychological theory 
would look like. It would give a detailed neural model of why some 
gestalts evoke aesthetic rapture when viewed in exactly the right 
conditions at exactly the right moment in our personal history. It 
would explain why aesthetic emotions sometimes occur unexpectedly, 
while we often feel flat in almost exactly the same situation. It would 
give us precise rules to produce art that evoked these feelings reliably. 
Models would make specific, falsifiable predictions, and be trans-
parently connected to the rest of the natural sciences. 
Although this is science fiction, there have been admirable recent 
attempts to transcend the narrow reductive approach while retaining 
some insights and methods from cognitive science. As mentioned, 
Pelowski (2015) elaborated on the schema shift ideas in Pelowski and 
Akiba (2011), and measured inclination to cry in response to Rothko 
paintings. This circumvented many problems on the X and Y axis. 
However, the approach has other weaknesses instead. First, there are 
still no precise production rules which could be programmed into a 
computer. Second, the background theory draws very heavily on intro-
spections of artists and critics. This yields insights which cannot be 
obtained in other ways (e.g. from neuroscience). But introspection is 
problematic: people will readily tell stories about their own feelings 
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and behaviours. But are these stories informed by a private, internal 
epistemic channel? Nisbett and Wilson (1977) argued that ‘intro-
spection’ is just the application of our own folk-psychological theories 
to ourselves. Third, there are problems with falsifiability. For 
example, the cognitive flow model in Pelowski and Akiba (2011) 
makes some novel predictions, but it could not be falsified by 
empirical data (e.g. the finding that most visitors did not feel tearful in 
art galleries was easily accommodated). Rich and multifaceted 
accounts cover more aspects of aesthetic experience, but at a cost: it 
becomes difficult to adjudicate between alternative accounts experi-
mentally. These are old frustrations with philosophical aesthetics, and 
they make the reductive scientific approach seem bold and pioneering 
again! 
Perhaps we can understand the gap between aesthetic science and 
aesthetic experience by comparing it to other gaps in human knowl-
edge. The philosopher Colin McGinn (e.g. 1994) divides the realm of 
the unknown into problems that can be solved by scientists, and the 
insoluble mysteries which eternally vex philosophers. McGinn pro-
poses that mysteries exist because intelligent minds have specific 
abilities and, consequently, specific limits. Rats will never understand 
prime numbers, so perhaps the human ability to understand natural 
phenomena is also limited? 
The origin of the universe is a mystery in the McGinn sense. Saying 
‘there was the Big Bang’ is tantamount to saying ‘it just happened’, 
while any advancement crashes into our unshakable intuitions about 
the nature of causality and time. According to McGinn the failure is a 
consequence of our uniquely human cognitive architecture. McGinn 
states: ‘That reason is flummoxed by a certain class of problems is 
thus no proof that those problems possess any inherent refractoriness, 
nor that there are no other conceivable epistemic systems that might 
take these problems in stride’ (ibid., p. 137). 
McGinn proposes a way of diagnosing mysteries, called the ‘DIME 
shape’. When trying (in vain) to explain a mysterious natural phenom-
enon, we first try to Demystify and Domesticate the object of our 
puzzlement by proposing a reductive explanatory theory (D), when 
this fails, we declare it Irreducible (I) and sometimes resort to 
Magical pseudo-explanations (M), or Eliminate the object from our 
ontology completely (E). These attempts are antagonistic, ‘so we hop 
unhappily from one unsatisfactory option to the next; or dig our heels 
(squintingly) into a position that seems the least intellectually uncon-
scionable of the bunch’ (ibid., p. 145). The DIME shape is the telltale 
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signature of human intelligence labouring under delusional aspirations 
to exceed innate limits. The recurring philosophical debates about the 
fit between consciousness and neurobiology can be attributed to the 
DIME dynamics. Of course, aesthetic experience is a conscious 
experience, and thus a mystery. But are there additional domain-
specific mysteries for scientific aesthetics besides this big one? 
When considering scientific aesthetics, we oscillate between pre-
ferring a reductive research programme (that says little about hot 
aesthetic experience) and preferring rich philosophical discourses (that 
are unfalsifiable). This grass-is-always-greener business loosely 
resembles the DIME dynamics discussed by McGinn. However, the 
DIME resemblance is not perfect. There is NO sheer cognitive cliff, 
which makes intuition seem painfully impotent. Aesthetic science 
would progress nicely if only we could reliably evoke and measure hot 
aesthetic emotions under controlled conditions. But aesthetic emotions 
are too fleeting and idiosyncratic, they are too minutely sensitive to 
thousands of internal and external details. We are like scientists who 
would love to measure a very rare whirlpool in a chaotic system, but 
cannot reliably recreate it in an artificial fluid tank. The DIME-like 
dynamics in aesthetic science reflect deliberation about how to pro-
ceed given this practical obstacle, not innate cognitive limitations of 
the type that make it impossible to intuitively understand conscious-
ness or the origin of the universe. 
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